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THE SEC AS A BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE,
INSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC, AND THE PROCESS OF
POLICY FORMULATION
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT*
Policy-making at the Securities and Exchange Commission has been
the subject of intellectual criticism almost since the agency's birth in 1934.
By and large, this has come in two sequential waves. The first, marked
by the scholarship of Louis Loss,' reflected lawyers' classical obsession
with precision and coherence. This movement sought to rationalize doctrine
with what its proponents saw as the underlying aims and objectives
articulated in the legislative sources and other historical "first principles."
It criticized the Commission's rule-making, interpretive pronouncements
and enforcement programs when (but only when) there was perceptible
disharmony.2 This first wave thus accepted the basic aims of securities
regulation largely as a given. By contrast, the second wave of criticism-
initiated largely by economists like George Stigler and George Benston in
the 1960s,3 and only later gaining substantial acceptance among legal
academics4-took direct issue with those aims. Challenging some of the
most sacred assumptions of the law as administered by the SEC, such as
the virtue of mandatory disclosure or the harmful nature of insider trading,
this view claims that the Commission has substantially overregulated in
areas such as disclosure policy, with excessive and paternalistic focus on
* @ 1990 by Donald C. Langevoort, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School
of Law. This essay is based on a lecture given at Washington and Lee University School of
Law on March 23, 1990. Portions are taken from materials prepared for inclusion in J.
Cox, R. HIL.MA & D. LANGEVOORT, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION (forthcoming, 1991).
1. This work continues today, in association with Loss' most prominent intellectual
disciple, Joel Seligman. L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcuRRnzs REGULATION (3d ed. 1989). In
many ways, this emphasis on historical coherence is a response to the rhythmic tendency of
securities law to vary between periods of romantic frenzy, where doctrine is deemphasized,
and doctrinal retrenchment. See Langevoort, The Education of a Securities Lawyer (book
review), 80 Nw. U.L. Rv. 259, 260-61 (1985).
2. This phase's lawyer-dominated influence was felt most plainly in the SEC's own
Special Study of the Securities Markets in the early 1960s, which sought to rationalize the
regulatory system in light of market developments since 1934, especially the growth of the
over-the-counter market. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1340 (1966). And it almost led to much more. Drawing strength from the Special Study,
the desire for coherence became the driving force behind the American Law Institute's
restatement-like Federal Securities Code project in the 1970s.
3. See Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964);
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of th Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973).
4. Dean Henry Manne was one notable exception in the legal community during the
earliest days as this wave built. E.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966).
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"investor protection" to the exclusion of more compelling notions of cost
justification and allocative efficiency. This was an attack on the rationality
of securities regulation. In the academic literature at least, the debate
generated by this second wave of criticism dominates today.
To state concerns about either coherence or rationality, however, does
not explain why it is that the Commission has behaved in a way that in
substance has seemed to so many either incoherent or irrational. Only in
the last decade has the literature even begun seriously to address this
behavioral question. My aim in this essay, therefore, is to look at the
SEC as a bureaucracy, to see if we can say something interesting about
the process of policy formulation that, in turn, can aid in our understand-
ing of the substance of securities regulation.
The behavioral explanation that recently has achieved the most cur-
rency draws from the body of literature on public choice theory, as
articulated by such notable economists as George Stigler and Sam Peltz-
man.5 Public choice theory posits that far from seeking any independent
conception of the "public good," regulators simply and rationally seek to
maximize their own level of external support, and thus frequently allocate
wealth (in the form of regulatory subsidies and/or restraints on competi-
tion) to those groups that bid the highest in terms of such support. Often,
this means regulation that actually favors some segment of the industry
that the agency is supposed to control (sometimes referred to as the
"capture" hypothesis), since that special interest is likely to be the best
organized and most effective "rent-seeker."
6
For instance, two economists who at one time served on the SEC
staff, Susan M. Phillips and J. Richard Zecher, have applied public choice
theory to the Commission's mandatory disclosure program.7 In their view,
published in 1981, the well-organized body of securities analysts and
institutional investors had succeeded in gaining a more than $1 billion
subsidy, with little compensating public benefit, by causing the Commission
to require formatted data from issuers that would otherwise be elicited
and pieced together at their own expense. Along the same public choice
lines, David Haddock and Jonathan Macey have sought to explain both
the failure of the SEC to pursue Congress' national market system goal
with sufficient vigor,' as well as the prevailing system of insider trading
5. E.g., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 211
(1976).
6. There are other explanations for the capture hypothesis, of course. One is that
agency staffs typically are at an informational and resource disadvantage vis-a-vis industry
participants and are thus forced (perhaps reluctantly) to rely on those participants in the
regulatory process. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1685-86 (1975).
7. S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 21-23 (1981).
8. Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market
System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315.
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regulation. 9 And former SEC Chief Economist Gregg Jarrell has invoked
it to explain the SEC-pressured movement away from fixed commission
rates on the stock exchanges in the mid-1970s. 0 Note that nothing in
public choice theory assumes that agency policy will constantly or rapidly
shift in support of the moment's highest bidder. Rather, policy will usually
reflect an accommodation or compromise among various competing inter-
ests (thus often being ambiguous and difficult to identify as special interest
regulation), with the balance changing only slowly as the political equilib-
rium shifts over time. But the bottom line is always responsiveness to
those external interests.
In the assumptions underlying its behavioral model, then, public choice
theory posits hyper-rational agency action. That,- of course, is where the
theory's descriptive power may at first seem questionable in its application
to the actions of administrative agencies, for there is both abundant
anecdotal evidence and a vast body of research on organizational behavior
that argues that the activity of bureaucracies is not characterized by a
high degree of either sensitivity or responsiveness to external stimuli.
Instead, typical behavior is more aptly described as inner-directed.
Classic works such as Anthony Downs' Inside Bureaucracy" maintain
that large organizations will over time inevitably begin to displace stated
goals with more self-serving institutional ones. Decisions made. within the
bureaucracy come to reflect a cognitive content that, in the words of one
author who has studied the interplay between law and organization theory,
is "the product of widely dispersed informational sources and diffused
individual interests and attitudes, all mediated by structures, processes and
chance in ways that defy translating or tracing the organizational decision
into its individual sources."' 2 Loss of control extends even (perhaps
especially) to those who are supposed to be running the organization. Such
diffusion of authority is the source of institutional biases that value
conservatism, risk avoidance, "turf protection" and routine. Such behavior
is especially pronounced in government agencies, which lack the discipline
imposed by a competitive marketplace, and whose line personnel are
protected from rapid replacement by civil service regulations.
While apparently in tension, the bureaucratic and public choice models
are not incompatible. Relaxing some of the formal assumptions of the
public choice model, one can posit intuitively that each decisionmaker
within a bureaucracy will act as a utility-maximizer. Utility, in turn, can
readily be understood in terms of that which serves as reward or compen-
sation for certain behavior and runs the gamut from external "bribes"
(e.g., promises of future employment in the private sector for key officials)
9. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an
Application to Insider Trading, 30 J. L. & ECON. (1987).
10. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.
L. & ECON. 273 (1984).
11. A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
12. M. DAN-CoHEN, RiGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1986).
1990]
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through ego gratification (e.g., favorable publicity) to institutional self-
preservation or internal consumption (e.g., enlarged or preserved turf or
budget, more leisure time for the staff)-even the sense of pride or
satisfaction that comes from doing a task well. Most of these goals,
however, are unobtainable except through cooperative group effort. One
naturally would assume, therefore, that agency behavior would be pri-
marily inner-directed--that is, explainable largely in terms of the difficult
process of mediating among the conflicting interests of group members-
until external stimuli change in a sufficiently compelling fashion so as to
draw a critical mass of attention outward. 3 For precisely the reasons
noted by public choice theorists, the diffuse and conflicting interests that
exist on the outside as well will make significant change based principally
on external perceptions a relatively infrequent occurrence. The deficiency
in the public choice literature about the SEC has not been misdirection,
therefore, but rather simply that it has not given proper emphasis to the
internal transaction and agency costs that operate as a counterweight to
the incentives to maximize institutional utility in external terms.
From this perspective of bureaucratic theory, for example, one ten-
dency for which the SEC long has been criticized becomes perfectly
predictable: risk aversion in the face of bounded rationality. It frequently
is noted that agency staffs rarely are rewarded for successes such as the
anticipation and prevention of a problem or the efficient balance of costs
and benefits of a particular rule, but inevitably blamed for publicly
observed failures within their jurisdictions. Vivid illustrations of the power
of risk aversion are the Commission's experiences with such issues as the
development of the national market system, the shelf-registration rule,
and-more recently-the development of the institutional resale market-
place (proposed rule 144A). In each of these settings, the Commission
backed off substantially from sensible and far reaching initiatives in the
face of largely speculative arguments that such steps could have unfortu-
nate consequences down the road-implicitly, consequences for which the
SEC would be blamed. Here, of course, the interplay between internal
and external stimuli is blurred; each of these decisions was very much the
confluence of organized interest group pressure 4 and the institutional
instinct for self-preservation.
This relates closely to another frequently observed property of bu-
reaucratic behavior exhibited by the SEC: its disinclination to adopt or
13. In drawing the internal-external distinction, I do not wish to overstate it. Many
forms of bureaucratic behavior serve both internal and external functions. For instance,
favorable publicity both enhances external support and provides internal compensation. Steps
taken with a view toward Congressional reaction are oriented both toward budget enlargement
and ego gratification.
14. See, e.g., "'PORTAL-A NASDAQ for Restricted Securities" in H. Bloomenthal,
ed., 12 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep., no. 2, at 100 (Feb. 1990) (describing "pocketbook"
reaction of the exchanges and some investment banking firms in seeking a down.scaling of
rule 144A).
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endorse bright-line rules, notwithstanding the obvious value of such an
approach in promoting planning and reducing the incidence of litigation.
Inevitably claiming that such an approach provides a "blueprint for
fraud," the Commission so often has seemed jealously intent on preserving
the largest degree of discretion to penalize conduct that it determines,
after the fact, to have been improper. One sees this in the Commission's
historic preference for making policy through no-action letters or enforce-
ment rather than through rule-making, 5 and in its niggardly approach to
the development of safe harbor rules in areas (like the nonpublic offering
exemption under the '33 Act) of considerable statutory ambiguity.' 6 The
flexibility that is preserved maximizes the effective scope of the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction and limits the opportunity for post hoc criticism based
on the perception that, as a result of the particular line that it drew, the
agency failed to prevent, if not encouraged, some activity that turned out
to be socially harmful.
Another source of criticism that has often been articulated focuses on
the dominance of lawyers in policymaking roles at the SEC. Along these
lines, for example, Homer Kripke has argued that attorney domination
has produced a regulatory "theology"-an impenetrable admixture of
highly technical securities law and unwritten lore, accessible only to the
experts inside and outside of the agency-that the Commission and its
staff fervently seek to perpetuate. 7 Here, again, there is a predictable
behavioral property. Regulators have a natural bias toward the presence
(or enhancement) of complex regulation, rather than its absence (or
reduction), 18 a function of institutional and personal self-esteem as well
as economic self-interest, In many ways, this same bias is held by lawyers
generally, and is hence reinforced when lawyers assume the function of
regulators. One readily sees the legal mindset of the Commission's staff,
for instance, in many of the immensely arcane and open-ended rules that
achieve a good deal of technical elegance, if nothing else. And once more,
this sort of behavior is likely to find at least one important source of
external support. Indeed, the overwhelming number of SEC Commissioners
and high level staff persons have been attorneys, and most have stayed at
the Commission for only a few years before moving on or returning to
private practice. Lawyers in private practice specializing in securities law-
peers of the Commission's principal decisionmakers, as well (often enough)
as their once and future employers-are direct beneficiaries of this mys-
terious theology. Whether one determines that this outcome is a function
of bureaucratic goal displacement or is a straightforward application of
15. See R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COUMSSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).
16. E.g., Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMoRY L.J. 67,
70 (1989).
17. H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PuRPosE 4, 18-20 (1979).
18. A. DowNs, supra note 11, calls this the "Law of Increasing Conserverism."
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:527
public choice theory, its likely effect on policy formulation cannot be
understated. 19
The fourth property of bureaucratic behavior, and the one on which
I would like to focus the remainder of this essay is to me the most
interesting. It is the tendency of any organization to adopt rhetorical
conventions as operative norms in the ongoing policy-making process.
Both common experience and bureaucratic theory teach that organizations
will often develop attachments to rhetoric, which rhetoric then becomes
increasingly influential in molding the later behavior of the agency.
Why? There are many reasons; one is that rhetoric operates as a signal
to external constituencies and thus serves a political function. But it plays
a more subtle internal role as well. To understand, it is necessary to
consider the collective means by which policy is made at an agency such
as the SEC. Depending on the type of media for its execution (enforcement
action, rule-making, etc.), an initiative is likely to begin at the high staff
level. This may be based on a signal from one or more of the Commis-
sioners, perhaps not. Once initiated, however, the matter is moved down-
ward to the staff group that will undertake the task of formulating the
proposed action, drafting the proposal and writing the supporting mem-
oranda. Once formulated, the draft moves through the supervisory layers
for editing and revision.
Like many agencies, the SEC is not a discrete pyramidal hierarchy;
rather, the various operating divisions (e.g., the General Counsel's Office,
Enforcement, Corporate Finance) maintain coordinate responsibility for
their various substantive jurisdictions. This means that some level of
consensus among jurisdictions has to be achieved at the staff level, lest
one oppose the proposal in front of the Commissioners and raise spectres
about impact that are likely to provoke the risk-averse instinct of the five
presidential appointees (who often have the lowest level of independent
information about the project). And, of course, even at the Commission
level, the presence of five separate persons who must come to a collegial
decision in favor of the proposal itself creates another point requiring
consensus-building.
20
What we have, then, is a highly complex coordination problem:
potentially scores of individual negotiations would have to occur to build
consensus from a clean slate. This, of course, would be immensely time-
19. For an insightful analysis of the effect of lawyer influence on the development of
Delaware corporation law, see Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
20. The creative role of the Commissioners is chilled by the Government in the Sunshine
Act, which requires a formal meeting, public unless certain conditions are met, anytime
more than two commissioners meet to discuss any policy-related issue. For a lament about
the role of the Commissioner, see "Old Hands Guide the SEC Along," Nat'l L.J., Jan.
29, 1990, at 32, quoting former Commissioner Joseph Grundfest as wishing (jokingly) that
he could be considered for a particular division director position so that he could have real
responsibility in the agency.
THE SEC AS A BUREAUCRACY
consuming (and typically frustrating in a hierarchical setting because other
sources of power have a fairly low cost ability to block a significant
initiative). Here, it seems, is where rhetorical conventions gain their power.
A person charged with formulating or reformulating the initiative is likely
to mold the proposal based on rhetoric previously agreed to in earlier
negotiations, if only to reduce both the risk and the transaction costs
attendant to gaining each successive level of approval. In this way, each
new initiative is influenced heavily by the perception of the past.
That last point is important, for it can actually enhance the power of
the rhetorical convention over time. As new staff and Commissioners are
introduced, their strategic behavior in molding initiatives ex ante so as to
gain consensus is influenced not so much by first-hand experience in earlier
negotiations but by some record of the historical result, typically the
written rhetoric used to explain the result. That, of course, may well serve
to overemphasize the rhetoric, but it is the best information available to
the rational participant in the process. Moreover, once rhetorical conven-
tions become established, their invocation (or incantation) becomes a
means of demonstrating good faith commitment to institutional goals
rather than some personal agenda, a key in any cooperative setting to
increased influence over time. Conversely, refusal to invoke them operates
as implicit criticism, instinctively a threat that may well lead to in-group
exclusion.2' Rhetoric, in other words, readily becomes theology, which in
turn plays an important bonding role within the organization. Some staff
will come to believe the conventions, others will simply assume them, and
still others will accommodate them notwithstanding lingering skepticism.
In this fashion, the expression of an idea comes to take on a life of its
own, especially in an environment characterized (as with the SEC) by
rapid turnover of key personnel.
What is the likely content of a rhetorical convention? A few gener-
alizations seem commonsensical. First, such conventions will serve the
interests of the widest possible audience within the organization. In this
way, it is no surprise that the most powerful conventions will tend to
reflect traditional bureaucratic tendencies: risk aversion over risk-taking,
flexibility over precision, and conservation of jurisdiction over alienation.
Where lawyers are involved heavily, those conventions will reflect what
lawyers are taught to value: technical elegance, the power and dispassion
of law, and the like. In this sense, of course, this property of bureaucratic
behavior simply describes a mechanism by which some of the other
properties described earlier become observable. Second, we may assume
that external influences-the organized interests on which public choice
theory concentrates-will operate on these conventions as they gain power,
providing either sustenance or impediments to their continued influence.
21. Cf. Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEmp. PROBS. 83; 100-101 (1985)
(describing in-group bias in the setting of corporate organizations).
1990]
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Finally, there is no reason to believe that such conventions will always be
valid or sound, especially as time goes on, or even internally consistent
with other recognized conventions. The value of the rhetoric is functional,
not necessarily substantive.
Stating this property in the abstract is far less illuminating than
illustrating it in practice. Unfortunately, no outsider (and indeed, few
insiders) are sufficiently privy to the entire policy formulation process to
know what is convention rather than analysis in any particular instance.
The best we can do is to look for situations where it appears that the
Commission and staff collectively have begun to assume the truth of some
assertion, rather than evaluating the issue de novo in connection with a
specific policy initiative.
With this limitation in mind, I would like to search for some rhetorical
conventions in an important setting of many of the Commission's delib-
erations today, the relative protection afforded by regulation to the indi-
vidual investor vis-a-vis institutional or professional investors. We are all
well aware of the gradual institutionalization of the securities markets.
Technological developments, increasing economies of scale and govern-
mental economic and social policies have all contributed to a domination
of daily trading volume by institutions such as pension funds, mutual
funds, insurance companies and bank trust departments, and-for many
high capitalization stocks, at least-domination of actual ownership as
well. 22 Potentially, this domination by itself may dampen individual in-
vestor interest in direct securities investment, by creating at least the
perception that individuals cannot compete on an equal footing with the
professionals, and thereby hasten the trend toward institutionalization. In
a number of instances, the SEC has taken direct or indirect action that,
ostensibly, is designed to limit the economic advantage of the institutional
investor, in effect an implicit statement of concern about this trend.
Our first stop in the search for conventions is the very concept that
often underlies such action: that individual investors are a necessary
component of the securities marketplace because they "add depth and
liquidity" to it. This notion is especially significant in today's deliberations
over marketplace volatility. 23 Precisely what it means, however, is uncer-
tain.24 If one assumes that individuals who forego direct investment will
simply channel their funds through an intermediary (rather than not invest
at all), then the total dollar amount of investment will not change. Nor
is there much evidence that the aggregate trading activity of individual
22. An intriguing set of statistics is put forth in Brancato & Gaughan, "The Growth
of Institutional Investors in the U.S. Capital Markets," a report prepared for the Institutional
Investor Project of the Columbia University School of Law (Nov. 1988).
23. See, e.g., Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the Effects
of Options, Futures and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789
(1987).
24. See Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering the Competitive Era: The Se-
curities Industry, SEC Policy and the Individual Investor, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 857 (1980).
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investors has any significant long-term price impact; it is widely agreed
that whatever efficiency properties the market possesses are largely the
product of informed investor behavior, which are dominated primarily by
the institutions. Admittedly, individuals are more dominant in some market
subsets: in the over-the-counter market, and as purchasers in initial public
offerings. In this sense, some of these issues might reasonably be char-
acterized in redistributional terms-changing the relative balance may, in
other words, affect the capital raising abilities of smaller companies vis-
a-vis larger ones in some limited number of cases. But that is not the use
to which this far broader rhetorical construct is put. So far as depth and
liquidity is concerned, the point reduces to the highly suspicious assertion
that a less informed or sophisticated segment of the market generally is
desirable per se.
The conceptual usefulness and sensibility of this rhetorical convention
is thus suspect, and one is left to wonder at its persistence. Its power as
a convention, however, is easily understood by reference to bureaucratic
behavior. Securities regulation as we know it is built on the very assump-
tion of the presence of a large number of individual investors; a wholly
institutionalized market would mean far less meaningful a role (and
substantially less political power) for the SEC. Both institutional self-
preservation and institutional self-esteem underlie these issues, then. And
if this is indeed a rhetorical convention, it is likely to have the full support
of a number of very important interest groups: the brokerage industry,
which counts on individual trading for a fair portion of its profitability,
and corporate managers, who benefit from a dispersed and disorganized
shareholder class. These two needs, no doubt, come together to give the
"depth and liquidity" assertion its force.
An important extension of this same convention is found in the
analytical framework built by the Commission in its rulemaking regarding
tender offers (and also, on occasion, its litigation program) under the
Williams Act. The Williams Act itself has an ambiguous intent, designed
largely to slow down the "Saturday Night Special" form of takeover bid,
where short tendering deadlines and "first-come, first-served" rules might
be thought to pressure shareholders into hasty and ill-informed decisions.
Over time, however-and with only the slightest bits of support from the
legislative history-the Commission has introduced into its policy formu-
lation efforts a primary objective of egalitarianism. This objective holds
that the average shareholder deserves at least the sense that he or she is
on a level playing field with the arbitrage community, with some fair
allocation of wealth between the two types of tendering target shareholders.
This objective has been articulated, more or less explicitly, in a long series
of policy initiatives, including the short- and hedged-tendering bars, the
anti-warehousing rule for insider trading regulation under rule 14e-3, the
"equal price" formulations of rules 14d-10 25 and lOb-13, and the more
25. Here we find the most explicit statement of the value of egalitarianism in takeover
19901
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recent proposal to deal with street sweeps. One can also see this close to
the surface in the Commission's litigation and amicus program with respect
to the definition of a tender offer, which has sought to turn many
nonconventional bids (typically, purchases mainly from arb's or institu-
tions) into public bids, thus granting individual shareholders rights of
participation.
26
Once again, close inspection renders this principle a curious one, not
only for its relative lack of statutory support. Each of these rulemaking
initiatives, by tying the hands of the arbitrageurs in some form or another,
makes takeover bids somewhat more risky and difficult to accomplish, a
result that intuitively would seem to deter some bidders from commencing
bids in the first place. In this sense, there may well be a net loss to the
average shareholder from this set of rules; at the very least, the issue is
far more ambiguous than any of the Commission's rhetoric would ever
acknowledge. On the other hand, this bias is again easy to understand in
bureaucratic terms. And no doubt the various antitakeover interest groups
are more than happy to offer external support to the continued existence
of this particular rhetoric, if not some of the other conventions that the
Commission has adopted in this field.
27
One notable feature of rhetorical conventions is the lack of any
necessary consistency among them. This can be illustrated by moving to
a third setting where the SEC has adopted a rather clear posture in recent
years, the treatment of investment analysts in the law of insider trading.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks,21 it is well
established that insiders (i.e., fiduciaries of the issuer) may not commu-
nicate inside information to others where the insider's intent is the pursuit
of personal benefit. The negative implication is that business-motivated
communications are immune from liability, and the Court clearly signalled
that its purpose in articulating this standard was the protection of com-
munications that are part of the information dissemination process, in-
cluding information divulged in a non-self-serving way to investment
regulation. See Exch. Act Rel. 22198, [1984-85] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,797 (July
22, 1985), at 87,559. For an intriguing study of the regulatory perspective, see Dennis, This
Little Piggy Went to Market: The Regulation of Risk Arbitrage After Boesky, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 841 (1988).
26. E.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting SEC's view).
27. The Commission's view that the Williams Act reflects a Congressional intent to
leave to the target shareholders the ultimate decision whether or not a bid should succeed
seems to be another questionable rhetorical convention (see Johnson & Millon, Misreading
the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989)), albeit another one that can reasonably
be understood in terms of institutional self-esteem and turf preservation. This convention
is used primarily in the Commission's effort to seek preemption of state "corporate law"
takeover statutes that can operate to chill the entire takeover process, where heretofore the
Commission has played a substantial role.
28. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See generally D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION § 11.02[l] (1990 ed.
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analysts. The theory behind this is that analyst activity is essential to the
existence of the efficient market, seen as a substantial public good. In
recent years, the Commission has embraced this view with a good deal of
enthusiasm. Most notably, it went so far as to propose legislation in
August 1987 that, among other things, would provide a safe harbor from
insider trading liability for bona fide communications to analysts. 29 This
posture is supported by a substantial body of literature from the academic
community. 0
At least when stated with such strength, this view is another curiosity.
On its face, it seems inconsistent with the general fairness rationale of the
insider trading prohibition generally, which demotes efficiency as the
primary concern. In practice, it allows some level of communication to
large, professionally informed investors that enables them to capture a
trading advantage unavailable to the average investor-precisely the con-
cern underlying the anti-tipping rule generally.
And on closer inspection, even greater ambiguity appears. First, it is
by no means clear that selective dissemination will in fact have the desired
efficiency effect: that depends on the ability of the market to identify
particular analysts' clients as having some sort of informational advantage,
and there is no reason to believe that that will typically be the case. a'
Second, there is a dissonance with the individual, rather than professional
investor bias that pervades so much else of the Commission's rhetoric.
The intellectual justification for protecting analysts is that the average
investor who desires the advantage that comes from such access as the
insider trading laws permit is free to purchase it 32-typically, by investing
in a professionally informed intermediary (e.g., a mutual fund). Yet this
would be precisely the sort of consequence that the Commission has
elsewhere sought to avoid. Finally, one must wonder whether a system
that encouraged "business-purpose" dissemination of inside information
to analysts that could be exploited by their clients would not result in
issuers subtly selling access to inside information to analysts. While such
sales might not be explicit, there is some possibility that access would be
traded for analyst favor: a form of paid "touting" of the company's
stock through public media. Nowhere has the Commission ever even
addressed any of these questions; yet the virtue of the analyst has reached
almost the level of idealization.
That suggests, once again, that the process of convention has taken
hold, albeit one with less obvious explanation in terms of bureaucratic
theory. In many ways it does seem to contradict the Commission's typical
29. Proposed § 16A(d)(4), reprinted in 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 14,
1987). The legislation did not pass either the Senate or the House.
30. E.g., Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127 (1984).
31. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv.
549, 572-79 (1984) (insider trading generally).
32. See Fischel, supra note 30, at 145.46.
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perception of institutional self-interest. Recall, however, that conventions
exist largely because they are efficient; strategic behavior in a bureaucratic
setting conforms to them on the assumption that their use will facilitate
the process of policy formation. In the end, it may simply be that rational
actors within the Commission have perceived that analysts are idealized
by some critical mass of persons with policy-making responsibility at this
particular point in time, and that no countervailing blocking tendency has
surfaced among others. If so, we might suspect that this convention will
have less staying power as personnel shifts over time. However, we should
also note that external political support that tends to exist in favor of the
natural consequence of any ideological adherence to the efficient market
theory-i.e., deregulation-and the specific self-interest of both the busi-
ness and professional investor communities in favor of the protected status
of communications to investment analysts. Once again, internal and ex-
ternal explanatory forces seem to have coalesced in this area, at least
temporarily.
The reference to the efficient market hypothesis deserves a further
comment, for in some ways it also has begun to show some of the
characteristics of a convention. In the last decade or so, the SEC has
indeed indicated a willingness to make policy conform to the view that,
at least for widely traded issuers, market prices do promptly reflect all
publicly available information. The perception of bureaucratic endorsement
has been sufficiently strong, in fact, that Judge Easterbrook was able to
write in a recent opinion, without qualification, that "[t]he Securities and
Exchange Commission believes that markets correctly value the securities
of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that
has been digested and expressed in the security's price.
' 3
Whether this is an accurate statement of the Commission's view or
not (it is probably itself something of a half-truth), it does illustrate the
pervasiveness of this perspective in the law today. In part, this is for good
reason. While some anomalies persist,34 there is little doubt that the
markets for widely followed stocks do exhibit a substantial degree of
informational efficiency-that is, the ability promptly to assimilate the
discovery of new data. And there are many reform initiatives in securities
regulation that properly follow from acceptance of this hypothesis. There
is apparently no such consensus, however, among economists on whether
the markets are allocatively efficient, i.e., whether the resulting prices,
though fully informed, bear a close relationship to the fundamental or
intrinsic value of the issuer's securities. John Maynard Keynes, for ex-
ample, was of the view that markets are often informationally but not
33. Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added).
34. See Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C.
DAvis L. Rpv. 341 (1986); Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1985).
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allocatively efficient,35 and he has many influential modern adherents. 6
Yet this continuing debate within the economics community has had
surprisingly little impact on a number of lawyers at and associated with
the SEC, some of whom seem to have determined, for whatever political,
professional or emotional reasons, that economists proved the efficient
market hypothesis a decade ago and moved on to other topics entirely,
so that all that is left is for the law to come into conformity with this
intellectual orthodoxy. In legal circles, the rhetoric of the efficient market,
too, may be taking on a life of its own.
CONCLUSION
The summary question arising from all of this is why it is important
to focus attention on the SEC's rhetorical conventions. Besides the inev-
itable academic answer (because understanding is a virtue in and of itself),
there seem to me two more discrete points.
First, understanding the process of policy formulation at an admin-
istrative agency says a good deal about the deference we ought to give to
agencies in such matters as statutory interpretation. A familiar canon of
construction holds that such deference is proper, on the assumption that
the agency has the superior sensitivity and expertise that enables it to
construe its underlying statute correctly, i.e., in a manner consonant with
statutory intent.17 Recent scholarship has offered plenty of reasons why
this canon is inapt in any event.3" The role of rhetorical conventions-
which will appear readily in the agency's interpretation-suggests the
additional reason that such interpretation may well tend to be the product
of assumptions from the past rather than thoughtful deliberation in a
contemporary setting.
The other is that identifying and acknowledging the presence of
conventions can in the end be constructive-at least if external political
forces are willing. Recall that conventions often reflect strategic behavior;
calling assumptions into question publicly may make a particular partici-
pant less likely to believe that reference back to previous negotiations will
in fact facilitate adoption of a new initiative. Internally, then, it may
make sense for agencies such as the SEC to conduct periodic audits of
assumptions (in the form of roundtable discussions, whether open or
closed to the public) as an antidote to excessive habitual behavior. Scholars
35. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 156
(1936).
36. E.g., Shiller, "Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets," in J. Coffee,
L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., KNiGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF
THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 56 (1988). From a legal perspective, see L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S
WRONG WITH WALL STREET (1988).
37. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
38. E.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 444-46 (1989).
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and practitioners from outside can help prompt such reevaluations. While
calls for reformation may often sound heretical, they are not always
fruitless: sometimes, even in bureaucracies, theology comes to be seen as
myth.
